While amorphous in all but its central components, the new U.S. diplomatic
initiative to halt the fighting in Bosnia would cede de facto control over
much of the country's territory to Croatia and Serbia. Although it would
nominally preserve Bosnia's sovereignty under a greatly weakened and yet to
be defined central authority, the plan would effectively partition the
country approximately into halves controlled by a Bosnian-Croatian federation
and a Serbian entity. If Serbian forces are not demilitarized or cut off
from support from Belgrade, partition is unavoidable.
The plan differs from the Contact Group map primarily by allowing Bosnian
Serb confederation with Serbia and a swap of key territories. A Serbian
withdrawal from Croatian territory in eastern Slavonia would be effectively
postponed through interim arrangements for United Nations administration of
the region.
Inducements to accept the plan include air strikes against selected Serbian
targets, termination of sanctions against Serbia, the promise of tens of
thousands of United States and other foreign troops to implement the plan,
pledges of large-scale economic assistance, and threats of an UNPROFOR
withdrawal and termination of the arms embargo.
If effected on the ground, the plan would reduce Bosnia to a truncated
archipelago with difficult to defend western and eastern enclaves. The
survival of the new state would be largely dependent upon outside aid and the
good will of its stronger neighbors. Serbia and Croatia could easily further
reduce Bosnia's territory through military action. In addition, they could
isolate it economically in order to force it to accede to political demands.
By accepting ethnically-based, forcible purges of populations, the plan would
lead to further this time, internationally sanctioned ethnic cleansing.
Muslims would likely become increasingly dominant in government-controlled
areas, while their influence in Serb- and Croat-controlled regions would be
virtually eliminated.
It is conceivable that granting hegemony to the Serbian aggressors and
introducing U.S. and other foreign ground troops would halt the fighting and
create conditions for reconstruction of hostile, but non-irredentist
neighboring states. It is more likely, however, that, by rewarding
aggression, the plan would:
- foster a continuation, if not escalation, of ethnic enmities;
- not be backed with sufficient inducements and support to prevent a return
to military adventurism, political extremism, and economic decline;
- freeze Serbian gains on the ground and, after a momentary pause, lead to
renewed Serbian terrorist attacks on civilians and Bosnian and Croatian
attempts to re-capture lost territory;
- encourage Serbia to escalate persecution of non-Serbs in Kosovo and other
areas of Serbia, thereby possibly expanding armed conflict in the region; and
- embolden would-be aggressors beyond the region by accepting the forcible
alteration of borders and population purges based on ethnicity.
WHAT IS THE PLAN?
While a few basic principles have been agreed to by the parties in Geneva,
the Clinton Administration's new "peace plan" has been more accurately
described as a "laundry list" or inventory of ideas and proposals it is
offering to the various negotiating parties. The Administration apparently
hopes to find an acceptable match of proposals that will ultimately form the
basis of a final settlement. This approach is similar to that employed last
year by the Contact Group countries (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and
the United States) with their "take-it-or-leave-it" map. Then, the mediators
had a specific map that would have split Bosnia between Serbian occupiers and
the Bosnian Federation, with the latter controlling 51 percent of Bosnia.
Beyond the map itself, however, there was no specific plan, merely issues
and concepts to be discussed. The mediators, therefore, had significant room
for maneuvering, since they had committed no details to writing. At the same
time, the approach created confusion even among the parties as to what was
actually on the table and agreed to by the Bosnians and their Croatian
partners.
Numerous press reports and other sources have revealed, however, the basic
outlines of what the Administration's envoys now are presenting, including
territorial swaps, political arrangements, and commitments concerning
enforcement of the potential agreement.
The Map: The plan is based on the Contact Group 51%-49% partition formula,
but several land "swaps" would consolidate Serbian gains in eastern Bosnia,
widen the vital Serbian supply corridor in northern Bosnia and, in exchange,
give the Bosnian government control over Sarajevo and its immediate environs.
Even the 51-49 formula, however, could be changed upon mutual agreement of
the parties. The map envisioned under this scheme would:
- Legitimize Serbian conquest of two of the three eastern enclaves, Zepa and
Srebrenica, and cede control of Gorazde, the remaining eastern "safe area,"
to the Serbs, who would then have full control over eastern Bosnia.
- Widen the northern Posavina corridor, which includes the Bosnian
government enclave of Brcko, thereby providing the Serbs with a more
defensible corridor for supplying Serbian forces in northern and western
Bosnia and providing a lifeline from Serbia proper to those areas.
- Provide narrow corridors or highways connecting Bosnian government-held
lands in central Bosnia with the enclaves of Brcko in the north and Bihac in
the northwest, effectively rendering them indefensible islands dependent upon
Serbian and Croatian good will and protection.
- Give the Bosnian government control over Sarajevo and its immediate
environs, and connect them to Government-held territory in central Bosnia.
Constitutional and Political Arrangements: These are probably the most
critical and, yet, least defined aspects of the plan. So far, the parties
have agreed to preserve a "unitary" Bosnian state at least for now comprised
of two autonomously governed "entities" the Bosnian Federation and the
"Republika Srpska" that would have separate constitutions and be allowed to
forge "parallel special relationships" with neighboring countries. While key
issues concerning the powers and structure of the central authority including
parliamentary, executive, and judicial institutions and powers of defense and
customs are yet to be negotiated, the Serb-controlled territory would have
virtual autonomy, with a largely symbolic central authority that would
nominally preserve Bosnia's "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity." This
central authority apparently would have little or no real control over
Bosnia's present borders, customs, or defense beyond Government-held areas.
The United States has also suggested that residents of the Serb-controlled
territory would also have the right to hold a referendum on independence in
five years.
In addition, Serbia is being asked "eventually" to recognize Bosnia's and
Croatia's borders and governments in return for an immediate termination of
international sanctions, which were originally linked to ending Serbian
occupation of Bosnian territory.
Eastern Slavonia: The U.S. plan calls for UN administration of the remaining
Serb-occupied region of Croatia for three years, after which time a permanent
settlement based on Croatia's sovereignty and territorial integrity would be
reached. The negotiators hope that Serbia's "eventual" recognition of
Croatia and its borders will, de facto, resolve this dispute.
United States Commitments: The United States is also committing to enforce
the agreement and (re)build Bosnia's infrastructure and military. It would
send up to 25,000 ground troops as part of a NATO contingent of up to 50,000
to enforce boundaries based on the new map. The troops would remain between
nine months and three years, although some might remain as "monitors" after
an initial withdrawal. In addition, the United States is committing to
provide the Bosnians with hundreds of millions of dollars in long-term
economic and military assistance. This package of short-term protection,
enforcement of the plan, and long-term assistance is designed to address
concerns about the rump Bosnia's military and economic viability.
WHY IS THE U.S. FINALLY LEADING?
The Clinton Administration's new peace plan for Bosnia comes at a moment when
not only the United States and its European allies, but also Bosnia, Croatia,
and Serbia are in position to see more clearly the likely consequences of an
extended war in the region. The U.S. and European abandonment of the
UN-declared "safe areas" of Srebrenica and Zepa and their civilian
populations to Serbian forces had greatly undermined Western credibility and
increased pressure for a reversal of current Western policies. At the same
time, Croatia's successful counter-offensive to re-capture the Krajina and
its joint campaign with the Bosnian Army in Bosnia's Bihac region had
demonstrated that Serbian territorial gains could be easily reversed by
adequately armed forces. Croatia's successful re-armament along with the
growing impatience of the U.S. Congress and Islamic and non-aligned nations
with Washington and Europe's failure to protect or defend Bosnia demonstrated
that, in the long-term, time appeared to be on the side of Serbia's victims.
Rather than build upon the Croatian victory by helping to turn the tide
decisively in favor of the victimized nations, the Administration has instead
thrown the use of NATO air power and the full weight of U.S. diplomacy behind
a settlement that would freeze most of Serbia's territorial gains in place.
In so doing, the President and his foreign policy team appear to be
motivated primarily by domestic calculations rather than fundamental
strategic and foreign policy interests:
- Britain and France had made clear that they would not stay in Bosnia for
another winter under current operating conditions. While the altered
situation on the ground following Croatia's liberation of the Krajina and the
Serbian capture of Srebrenica and Zepa had rendered a large American troop
deployment to assist in UNPROFOR's evacuation less likely, a withdrawal would
still almost inevitably lead to an end to the arms embargo and, in the
Administration's analysis, more fighting.
- It also had become clear that, unless the ground situation in Bosnia
stabilized or the Administration was making substantial progress toward a
settlement, the Congress would probably override the President's veto of the
Dole-Lieberman bill to end the arms embargo against the Bosnian government.
This would be the biggest foreign policy defeat for an American president in
more than a decade and, in the Administration's calculation, lead to more
fighting.
- The President's political advisors believed that domestic political and
public opposition to President Clinton's handling of the Bosnian conflict was
likely to grow as the Presidential campaign began. White House advisers,
with whom the new U.S. initiative originated, may have concluded that a quick
settlement (of virtually any sort) would be preferable to continued fighting
(of any sort). They also may have concluded that a serious attempt, even if
belated and ultimately unsuccessful, would be better politically than
continued inaction. As a result, the Administration either had to find a way
to keep the UNPROFOR troops in place or obtain a quick settlement.
INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES:
GETTING TO THE TABLE AND BEYOND
The plan does not satisfy the strategic goals of any party completely,
although it comes closest to realizing those of Croatia and Serbia. In an
effort to entice or compel cooperation at the negotiating table and in the
implementation phase of the agreement, the United States is presenting a
number of positive and negative inducements to Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia in
order to win agreement to the settlement.
Serbia: Air Strikes, Sanctions, and Land. Intermittently since August 30,
NATO has launched air strikes on selected Serbian targets. While the
thousands of sorties represent the largest use of air power since the war in
Bosnia began, it appears that they were used primarily to ease the siege of
Sarajevo and induce the Bosnian Serbs to agree to negotiate and accept the
newly proposed territorial division. Accordingly, the strikes have been
directed at a small number of targets that, if destroyed, would not adversely
affect the Serbs' ability to hold territory. While the strikes have
decreased the Bosnian Serbs' ability to command and control their troops in
the short term, very little weaponry has been destroyed. Virtually all of
the targets have been around Sarajevo, in territory that the Administration
is asking the Serbs to relinquish under the new partition map, or areas
through which the UN might withdraw. For example, the strikes undoubtedly
softened Serbian positions around Sarajevo and Tuzla, while few strikes have
been conducted around Banja Luka and Brcko, where the Serbs would keep land
or get more territory under the new map.
Serbia itself is being offered a termination of international sanctions in
return for its "eventual" diplomatic recognition of Bosnia and Croatia.
Throughout this year, the Administration had advocated a suspension of UN
sanctions against Serbia in exchange for Belgrade's full diplomatic
recognition of its neighbors. After Serbian President Milosevic refused
several months ago to accept the offer already a weakening of the Contact
Group's 1994 ultimatum, which called for tightening the sanctions, the
Administration offered sanctions relief in exchange for mere recognition of
Bosnia's borders. Milosevic could have thereby acknowledged the existence of
Bosnia as a country while at the same time continuing to treat his Bosnian
Serb proxies as its rightful government. Nevertheless, he still balked.
Now, in exchange for promising to grant recognition and securing Bosnian Serb
acceptance of the plan, UN sanctions against Serbia would be terminated. The
new offer represents a return to the original Contact Group concept in that
it demands that Serbia recognize Bosnia and its government within its
internationally recognized borders. At the same time, however, it
significantly weakens the original Contact Group position by offering
Milosevic outright termination, rather than mere suspension, of sanctions in
exchange for recognition. This is critical since Russia would almost
certainly block any attempt to re-impose the sanctions.
The timing of the termination will be central to the issue. Administration
officials have suggested that Milosevic would not have to recognize Bosnia
and Croatia immediately. In light of his record, however, rewarding him for
yet another commitment rather than deeds is naive at best. Anything less
than a firm, detailed, non-negotiable proposal also makes it likely that
Milosevic will demand changes in his favor at the last minute.
In addition, by offering Milosevic a termination of sanctions under these
conditions, the United States is dramatically lowering the threshold for
Serbia's reentry into the international community. While recognizing his
neighbors at some point, Milosevic will retain at least de facto control over
at least 49 percent of Bosnia and, perhaps, part of Croatia. He can also be
expected to continue his material and financial support for the Bosnian Serb
military, which is, in reality, part of the Serbian armed forces under
Belgrade's command. His ongoing support of Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb
forces is a clear violation of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and
numerous international treaties. It is also a violation of resolutions
demanding, generally, a cessation of his interference in Bosnia and Croatia,
the disbanding, disarming, and withdrawal of Serbian forces in Bosnia, and,
specifically, the termination of his re-supply of Serbian forces outside of
his own borders, which were the original conditions for terminating
sanctions. (See, inter alia, UNSC Resolutions 752, 757, 820, and 943.)
If Serbian forces refuse to accept the plan, the Administration has vowed to:
- lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government;
- launch a large-scale strategic bombing campaign against Serbian targets;
and
- support the introduction of tens of thousands of troops from countries
friendly to Bosnia to come to its defense.
This approach assumes that Britain and France will agree to these steps, yet
their cooperation has by no means been guaranteed. In addition, it envisions
measures that, in accordance with the UN Charter and other specific
international decisions, should have been taken three years ago. Indeed, the
Administration has repeatedly committed itself to provide for Bosnia's
defense. Numerous valid UN Security Council resolutions including, for
example, UNSC Resolutions 824 and 836 called for protection of Bosnia's
civilian population against Serbian attack. Resolution 752 called for all
forces except the Bosnian Army to disarm, disband, or withdraw from Bosnia.
Unfortunately, these and other commitments were not honored.
Croatia: Land, Dominance of Bosnia, and Acceptance by the West. Inducements
for Croatian cooperation appear, on the surface, more limited than those
offered to Serbia. In part, this is because Croatia has accepted every
proposed settlement for Bosnia and has consistently been offered more than it
might deserve given the limited size of the Croat population in Bosnia. It
is also because Croatia already accomplished its major military goal of
recapturing the Krajina and western Slavonia from Serb occupation forces. A
closer look, however, reveals an impressive array of "incentives" being
offered to Zagreb, including control over Bosnian territory, economic and
political hegemony over most of the rump Bosnia envisioned in the plan, and
first steps toward greater acceptance by the West.
Under the U.S. plan, the Bosnian government-Bosnian Croat Federation would
hold 51 percent of Bosnia's territory. Yet the Federation has not
reintegrated Croatian-held lands, where Croatian forces maintain their own
border crossing checkpoints, Croatian currency is used, and political and
military control remains firmly in the hands of separatist Croats.
Therefore, the plan would effectively grant Croatia and its proxies in
Bosnia de facto control over more than thirty percent of Bosnia. Bosnian
government-held territory, moreover, will be effectively dependent upon
Croatia for its economic, political, and military survival. Virtually
land-locked and surrounded by Croatian and Serbian forces, the rump Bosnia
will have to cultivate Croatian good will for trade and protection. The U.S.
plan, in effect, would make the Bosnian Federation the successor to the
Bosnian Republic, thereby making the continued participation of Bosnian Croat
areas in the Federation necessary for its survival. This dependency could
ultimately make Bosnia a protectorate of Croatia.
In addition, Croatia has been offered economic and military assistance,
including participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace program and,
reportedly, closer ties to the European Union.
Bosnia: Long-Term Economic and Military Assistance. The Clinton
Administration is promising to give Bosnia hundreds of millions of dollars in
reconstruction and military assistance if it accepts the plan, thereby
implying that such assistance would be withheld if Bosnia rejects the plan.
While large-scale contributions from European nations could conceivably be
withheld to "punish" Bosnia in such circumstances, the Administration's
description of the U.S. component may mislead the Bosnian government. U.S.
assistance efforts will likely be spearheaded not by the Administration, but
by Congress, where Bosnia has enjoyed its strongest international support. A
Congressional aid package for a multi-ethnic, undivided Bosnia is very
unlikely to be adversely affected by a Bosnian refusal to accept the current
partition plan. Congress is already on record in support not only of lifting
the arms embargo against Bosnia, but also of providing arms to the Bosnian
government. Even Senators Helms and McConnell and other strong critics of
foreign aid support assistance to Bosnia.
However, they as well as other prospective donors and investors are far less
likely to support either a poor and internally fractured Bosnia or two or
three separate Bosnian economies. Indeed, they can be expected to block
assistance efforts to Serbia and the Bosnian Serb "entity" as long as
ultra-nationalists and other non-democratic figures remain in control. In
addition, they will be unlikely to support assistance packages if their
effectiveness, utility, and even delivery cannot be reasonably guaranteed.
Perhaps because it intends to use its planned reconstruction assistance
program as a threat as well as an inducement for the Bosnians, the
Administration has thus far not consulted with the Congress on this issue.
Nevertheless, the proposal should be subjected to close scrutiny. So should
the proposal to introduce U.S. and other foreign troops to implement the
plan. The Administration has also not consulted with Congress on this issue,
yet Members are likely to object almost as strongly to the use of U.S. troops
to divide a UN-member country as to assume a combat role.
Plans for military assistance should also be subjected to scrutiny. These
should fully address the timing of receipt of arms, training, and other aid.
They should also fully explain measures by which the Contact Group states
intend to ensure that Serbian forces in Bosnia are demilitarized. Since this
is unlikely, an alternative approach would be to cut off military support
from Serbia. If Serbian forces are not diminished in either of these ways,
the country will be effectively partitioned regardless of the strength of any
constitutional, civic, or governmental arrangements under the plan. Serbian
military control will guarantee political and economic control as well.
If the Bosnian government refuses to accept the plan, the Administration
envisions withdrawing the UNPROFOR mission and lifting the arms embargo
against Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. The Bosnian government will have to
decide whether it finds that, as winter approaches, UNPROFOR troops can serve
a useful purpose. In recent months, they clearly had not. They abandoned
Srebrenica and Zepa to Serbian forces. In Srebrenica, they did not even act
to prevent the separation and detention of civilian men and boys, thousands
of whom were apparently systematically murdered by Serbian forces. Shortly
thereafter, they withdrew from Gorazde. They allowed Sarajevo airport to
remain closed to humanitarian flights for five months. In Bihac, they took
no action to halt or even address a ground assault that combined Serbian
forces launched in late 1994 and that ended only when the Bosnian and
Croatian armies broke the siege of the enclave without UN protection or
assistance. More recently, however, the Rapid Reaction Force has responded
forcefully to Serbian attacks and participated in NATO attacks on selected
Serbian targets around Sarajevo.
ANALYSIS OF THE PLAN
This plan is the latest in a series of international peace plans that have
offered progressively more strategically important territory to the Serbs at
the expense of the surviving Bosnian entity's political, economic, and
military viability. Indeed, virtually all concessions from the previous plan
are made to the Serbs, while virtually all sacrifices are being asked of the
Bosnian government. With the Serbs still in a dominant position militarily
at least while the arms embargo against Bosnia remains in place and NATO
remains unwilling to use air strikes to eliminate Serbian weaponry, the
United States is primarily concerned with finding terms acceptable to the
Serbs. The Serbs, therefore, know that they will be offered increasingly
favorable terms, and accordingly, can be expected to harden their
negotiating stance. The Bosnian government and their Croat allies,
meanwhile, remain highly susceptible to U.S. and international pressures.
Several key factors will make agreement on the plan difficult to obtain.
- NATO air strikes have avoided threatening the Serb's ability to hold the
two-thirds of Bosnia they now control.
- The Bosnian Army is better trained and commanded and believes that time is
on its side.
- Even if the Serbs prove willing to give up land at the table, many
analysts doubt there is a 51-49 division that can satisfy their ultimate
territorial goals.
- Such a division is unlikely to yield a viable truncated Bosnia, especially
given the probable archipelago-like nature of such an entity under a de facto
partition.
- Even if a map is agreed upon, constitutional and political arrangements
have proven to be the most difficult hurdle in past negotiations. And,
- Even if a full agreement were signed, enforcement would require NATO,
including U.S. forces, to be willing to use force to compel the Serbs to
withdraw to the 51-49 line; this is highly unlikely.
The Map: Territorial "Exchanges"
The new plan, which abandons any remaining pretense that the June, 1994,
Contact Group map was a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer to the Bosnian Serbs,
represents a major shift in the Administration's position regarding a
territorial settlement; the Administration has become even more "pragmatic"
about a carve-up than former European Union negotiator David Owen. In order
to achieve "defensible" territories and internal borders, the Administration
is now apparently willing to countenance large-scale territorial swaps and
changes to previous partition maps. Unfortunately, the Serb-controlled
territory will be made more defensible, while the Bosnian Federation and
certainly Bosnian government-held lands would remain a highly vulnerable
archipelago, defensively and economically.
Three Eastern "Safe Areas." A major military goal of the Serbian aggressors
in Bosnia has been to consolidate control over an ethnically purified eastern
Bosnia, including the main water and land routes through the region. The
conquest of Zepa and Srebrenica and the suggested surrender of Gorazde under
the U.S. plan would satisfy this strategic war aim and, in and of itself,
accomplish the creation of a Greater Serbia that incorporates lands that were
previously inhabited primarily by non-Serbs. The area would be fully
defensible if rid of the remaining Bosnian government enclave, especially
given its long border with Serbia proper.
The offering of Gorazde at the negotiating table also represents the final
abandonment of the original "safe areas" and of the UN/NATO commitment to
defend them. For now, however, the Bosnian government remains firm in its
refusal to give up any territory, especially Gorazde.
Brcko. Since the Serbian attacks in the Krajina and Banja Luka in the
earliest days of the war, the narrow and extremely vulnerable Posavina
corridor has provided the essential land link between Serbia and its proxies
in Bosnia and Croatia. While its closure would inevitably deal a severe blow
to the Serbian war effort, the Bosnian and Croatian armies have been able
only to narrow, not close, it through ground action. The United States and
its allies, in spite of numerous empowering resolutions and UN Security
Council demands, have refused to use air power to assist in cutting off the
corridor.
Now, rather than closing it or freezing current front lines, the
Administration is actively seeking to widen from about 1.5 miles to perhaps
five or ten miles wide at its narrowest point and secure the corridor,
thereby fulfilling a key war aim that Serbian forces have been unable to
achieve on the battlefield. By strengthening this link between Serbia and
its forces in Bosnia the geographical fulcrum of a "Greater Serbia" the
Administration fundamentally undermines its claim that the new plan preserves
an undivided, unitary Bosnia.
By enhancing the Serbs' ability to hold and defend the Posavina corridor, the
U.S. plan would also make Federation territory in the north more vulnerable.
Under the Contact Group map and the earlier Owen-Stoltenberg plan, Brcko
would have been linked to central Bosnia by a short overpass. As incredible
as that concept might have appeared at the time, such an arrangement through
a widened Posavina corridor would appear to be completely unworkable. A
similar arrangement, however, may also be contemplated for linking Bihac in
the northwest to central Bosnia. It is not clear how the Administration
envisions making these links even remotely defensible.
Sarajevo. The only strategically significant territorial withdrawal being
asked of the Serbs involves Serb-held land around Sarajevo. A divided
Sarajevo or an entirely ultra-nationalist Serb Sarajevo has been a major war
objective of the Bosnian Serb forces since 1992, when their self-styled
leader Radovan Karadzic told the U.S. Ambassador to Belgrade of his vision of
a Sarajevo divided by a "new Berlin wall." Until now, the Contact Group
states had advocated UN administration of Sarajevo for a two-year period.
The Bosnian government had supported the notion in principle, but, on 18
August, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic stated that Bosnia was no longer
willing to "have Sarajevo administered by the United Nations." Since then,
the Bosnian government has sent less clear signals about its intentions.
Even if Sarajevo remains divided or is placed under UN administration, a
Serbian withdrawal even a partial one would increase the capital's
defensibility. The key issue, however, is how far Serbian guns would be
withdrawn and how much territory would be returned to the Bosnian government.
If Serbian gunners remain in the surrounding hills, or even within
long-range artillery range, the Serbs will retain the ability to lay siege to
the capital in the future. Even the NATO heavy weapons exclusion zone, which
extends twenty kilometers (12.5 miles) from Sarajevo's center but excludes
the Serb-controlled city of Pale, would leave such artillery well within
range of the capital, and snipers and smaller mortars not included in the
exclusion zone arrangement would remain within easy reach.
Constitutional and Political Arrangements
Autonomy and Possible Independence for Serb-Held Regions. The plan
effectively partitions Bosnia into two separate entities. It offers virtual
autonomy for the approximately 49% of Bosnia that would remain under Serbian
control. It would apparently provide for only a pro forma central
government. The allowance for "special relations" with neighboring countries
means the ability to conduct foreign relations or to form a confederation,
either of which would seriously threaten if not destroy Bosnia's sovereignty.
The plan's provision for separate constitutions will likely result in
separate border controls, customs, and military forces all of which would
further erode Bosnia's sovereignty. As noted earlier, Serbian military
control over 49 percent of the country virtually guarantees political and
economic partition. The United States is also advocating that the
Serb-controlled half of Bosnia should have the right to hold a referendum on
independence in five years.
The net result would be the rewarding of more than three years of aggression
and genocide with half of a multi-ethnic UN member state's territory. This
plan would freeze in place not only Serbian territorial control over half of
Bosnia, but also its authoritarian political control over the population
remaining in these areas.
Granting Serbia and its proxies this level of control and authority over half
of Bosnia might compel Croatia and its proxies in Bosnia to re-think their
participation in the Bosnian Federation. Aside from continuing pressure from
the U.S. and Germany to remain in the Federation, the potential for Croatian
hegemony over what essentially could become a Bosnian Federation satellite of
Croatia would be the most convincing reason for not abandoning Bosnia and
effecting a three-way partition.
Unlike the U.S. plan, a comprehensive plan that would truly preserve Bosnia's
territorial integrity and sovereignty would include precise descriptions of
the following integral political and military processes covering not only
Bosnian-Croatian Federation territory, but also Serb-held territory:
- central government authority over border controls, customs, foreign policy
and national defense;
- demilitarization of the areas not under government control, including
precise procedures for removal or, better still, destruction of weaponry;
- removal of paramilitary governors appointed by Serbian forces;
- apprehension, arrest, and extradition of indicted war criminals present in
the territories;
- guaranteed right of return of all refugees;
- creation of conditions conducive to the return of refugees;
- establishment of democratic civil authority;
- valid election of new democratic leaders after the return of refugees;
- restitution of property to its rightful owners; and
- an effective and efficient program for economic aid and reconstruction
assistance.
Mutual Recognition. By calling for Serbia's "eventual" diplomatic
recognition of Bosnia and Croatia, the United States apparently believes that
full partition will be impossible, or at least unlikely. As with its support
for the Contact Group's 1994 map, the Bosnian government seems to have backed
the recognition scheme primarily because it thought that the Serbs would
refuse. Nothing in Milosevic's past performance or that of the Contact
Group, for that matter suggests that such recognition, even if granted
quickly and unconditionally, would ever be more than a paper promise.
Croatia's aggression against Bosnia in 1993 demonstrates that recognition
does not guarantee borders. In 1992, Croatia became the first country to
recognize Bosnia's independence and borders. One year later, Zagreb launched
its own campaign for a Greater Croatia carved from Bosnian territory.
Belgrade can be expected to behave even less responsibly, especially if
sanctions have already been terminated.
Eastern Slavonia
The plan would establish a framework for resolution of what the
Administration calls the eastern Slavonia "situation" i.e., Serbian
occupation of part of Croatia's territory. Serbian forces have controlled
the region for four years.
Following its successful re-annexation of its Krajina region, Croatia
refrained from a similar offensive to retake eastern Slavonia, in part
because it would be militarily more difficult and because it could have led
to overt Serbian Army involvement in the conflict. Since the new U.S.
initiative was launched, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has stated that he
will give the plan three to four months to achieve a satisfactory conclusion
to the occupation. He claims that, if the plan fails, he will take military
action.
Whether the Administration will actually pressure Milosevic to give up the
last remaining parcel of Croatian territory under his control remains to be
seen. So far, Administration officials have sent discouraging signals.
While acknowledging that eastern Slavonia is part of Croatia, Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, the leader of the U.S. delegation, has
stated that the region is "different" from other disputed Croatian territory
because it borders Serbia. He has also downplayed its significance by
pointing out that the occupied region constitutes only four percent of
Croatia's territory. Yet that four percent is, in addition to being very
fertile agriculturally, the most oil-rich parcel in the Balkans. The issue
was so contentious during the Geneva talks that it was taken off the agenda.
The international community has, however, been more supportive of Croatia's
territorial integrity and sovereignty than it has been of Bosnia's.
U.S. Commitments
Even if U.S. mediators are able to forge an agreement all can sign,
implementation will depend in large part on a series of U.S. commitments,
including the pledge to send up to 25,000 American ground troops as part of a
NATO contingent to enforce the map's provisions. The Administration's
commitment itself is suspect. Congress' willingness to send U.S. troops to
effect what is considered by many to be an unenforceable and immoral ethnic
partition and to serve as "apartheid police" is being severely questioned.
Indeed, the House recently passed an amendment that would deny funding for
any troop deployment to the former Yugoslavia unless it was to assist in a UN
withdrawal. Even if U.S. troops are deployed, Serbian forces should be
expected to resist withdrawing to their 49 percent boundary, thereby placing
U.S. troops in the position of having to use force on the ground to ensure
compliance.
CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS
Few close observers of, or even participants in, the negotiating process
believe a partition plan like the one envisioned in the current U.S.
initiative will bring peace to Bosnia and the Balkans. Many, in fact,
believe this approach will encourage more fighting and "ethnic cleansing" and
will, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect. The plan faces enormous
stumbling blocks at every turn.
The negotiating obstacles are considerable. Agreement on the 51-49 split
does not ensure that the parties will agree on how to draw the map. In fact,
the Bosnians agreed to the 51-49 division in part because they could not
envision a map under such a split that would be acceptable to the Serbs.
Even if agreement were reached on a map, the Bosnians and the Serbs still
have diametrically opposed concepts of what are acceptable constitutional and
political arrangements for post-war Bosnia.
This plan has a greater chance of getting to the point of initial agreement
on a framework or settlement, however, than any previous international
initiative. This is true primarily because it offers Serbia more favorable
territorial terms for a settlement and because it has the full backing of the
Administration. Indeed, the United States and its allies have presented
President Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb proxies with increasingly attractive
offers, from the Vance-Owen plan in early 1993 to the sanctions
relief-for-recognition variant on the Contact Group plan earlier this year.
In spite of Milosevic's orchestration and uninterrupted support of the
Bosnian and Croatian Serbs' war effort, the new plan offers him sanctions
relief, half of Bosnia, negotiations that will allow him to prolong Serbia's
occupation of Croatia's Eastern Slavonia region, and a largely unconditional
entree into the community of nations. The plan grants, ratifies, and
legitimizes most of the Bosnian Serbs' war aims, including a contiguous
territorial entity, at least two of the eastern "safe areas," a more
defensible Brcko corridor, and confederation and the likelihood of eventual
secession or federation with Serbia proper. They have already won
recognition of their previously self-proclaimed status as the "Republika
Srpska."
Bosnia and pro-multi-ethnic officials within its leadership would emerge as
the clear losers, yet the Sarajevo government will be under extraordinary
Western pressure to end the war and accept the plan. Hard-liners in the
ruling SDA party may add to the pressure on moderate officials and army
commanders who prefer to continue to defend the country and re-capture
territory. These supporters of a Muslim-dominated state and single-party
rule will be particularly tempted to agree to the plan, which offers them
even greater power over a state that would be instantly cut off from much of
its non-Muslim population. It also offers them the chance to add a rich
reconstruction effort to the governmental, military, and industrial functions
that they have increasingly dominated in recent months. But they may find
reconstruction of their mini-state complicated by its proximity to a pariah
mini-state and by potential donors' confusion and skepticism.
At the same time, countervailing pressures could send the American delegation
back to Washington empty-handed. Within Serbia, hard-line nationalist
pressures of Milosevic's own making will prevent him from accepting any
settlement that could be viewed domestically as a sell-out or cut-off of his
proxies in Bosnia and Croatia. The immediate prize of sanctions relief may
not be enough to guarantee maintenance of his tight grip on power. In
Croatia, Tudjman's restoration of sovereignty over the Krajina region may
have made his re-election virtually inevitable, yet acceptance of a deal that
would give even more official sanction to Serbia's occupation of Eastern
Slavonia would revive strong public and army pressures on Tudjman and his
tight circle of leaders. In Bosnia, a majority of officials remains
committed to a multi-ethnic, democratic nation including all of its
internationally recognized territory and embracing all non-Muslims committed
to the same ideals. Over the past year, their political stock has fallen in
direct proportion to the Clinton Administration's failures to honor its
commitments to protect and defend these principles. Their success now in
rejecting de facto partition or in winning more favorable terms for a
settlement will be largely determined by the army's continuing will to fight.
Assuming that some kind of agreement on partition is reached, the Serbs
should be expected to resist withdrawing to the new lines unless forced.
U.S. and NATO troops, if they indeed materialize, must be prepared to force
them back. If the U.S. and its allies are not prepared to do so which is
likely then the agreement will likely fall apart and we will revert to the
present situation, but with U.S. troops caught in the middle. Western will
would then be tested perhaps more strongly than at any point to date as the
United States and its allies contemplated arming the Bosnians and launching a
bombing campaign to halt the Serbian war machine. If the Serbs did withdraw,
enormous forced and voluntary population transfers, including new "ethnic
cleansing" by Serbian forces, will certainly result, affecting tens of
thousands of civilians throughout the country. The fate of those involved in
or resulting from mixed marriages, as well as Jews and other minorities,
would be of great concern, since the rump Bosnia that resulted would be
overwhelmed by the influx of Muslim refugees and could become dominated by
elements in the ruling SDA party that would prefer a mini-state for Muslims
loyal to the party.
The precedents established by the U.S. and its international partners would
have far reaching effects. In Serbia itself, the Belgrade regime would
likely be emboldened, if not compelled, to step up "ethnic cleansing" and
persecution of non-Serbs in Kosovo, the Voyvodina, and the Sanjak. Other
parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union may seek to resolve their
border and minorities disputes in a similar fashion to Serbia. The resulting
instability in the Balkans and beyond will dramatically impact upon U.S.
interests throughout Europe.