Courtesy of the AMERICAN COMMITTEE
TO SAVE BOSNIA

 December 1994

A HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS - OVERVIEW

 
To date there have been four major diplomatic initiatives involving
peace plans for the former Yugoslavia: The Vance Plan for Croatia (January
1992) The Vance-Owen Plan (1992-93) The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (Summer-Fall
1993) The Contact Group Plan (May 1994-Present) All four plans were ultimately
accepted by the Bosnian Government and rejected by Karadzic and the Serbs.
In addition, the UN Security Council has passed numerous resolutions in
the past three years designed to compel Serbian behavior and facilitate
a return to peace and stability in the region. These resolutions included
demands for all forces not under the command of the Bosnian Government
to be disarmed, disbanded or withdrawn from Bosnia, a prohibition on all
exports from Serbia to Bosnia (part of the sanctions imposed on Serbia-Montenegro),
and the creation of "safe areas" in Bosnia. Serbian forces continue to
violate all of these UN resolutions with impunity. THE VANCE PLAN FOR CROATIA
(JANUARY 1992) Then-UN mediator Cyrus Vance drafted a plan to stop the
war in Croatia and prevent the resumption of armed conflict. The Vance
Plan was agreed to in January of 1992. Under the agreement, 14,000 UN peacekeepers
were to be deployed to disconnected areas of Croatia occupied by the Yugoslav
Army and other Serb-controlled forces (especially the region along the
Bosnian border known as the Krajina); these became known thereafter as
the UN Protected Areas (UNPAs). The Yugoslav Army troops were to withdraw
to Serbia-Montenegro, paramilitary forces were to be disarmed, and an international
conference was to negotiate a full political settlement. The goal was to
eventually facilitate the re-establishment of Croatia's sovereignty and
territorial integrity while providing sufficient protection of Serbian
minority rights and some degree of autonomy for Serb-majority lands. The
UN troops deployed, some Yugoslav Army troops withdrew into Bosnia ( where
they soon began to seize territory ( but other Yugoslav troops remained
in the UNPAs wearing new "Republic of Serbian Krajina" uniforms. The UN
mandate for the UNPAs has been renewed every six months since that time,
but it remains unfulfilled. Serb forces have consolidated their control
over the UNPAs, continued to "ethnically cleanse" the areas of non-Serbs
and periodically shell Croatian government-held territory. The UN frequently
has been placed in the troubling dilemma of having to facilitate Serbian
"ethnic cleansing" by busing non-Serbs from Serb-held territory ( or have
the trapped inhabitants terrorized and killed by Serbian troops. The Krajina
Serb forces recently coordinated large air, artillery, and infantry attacks
from Serb-held Croatia with the Bosnian Serbs in their offensive on the
Bosnian "safe area" of Bihac. Many observers believe that the failure of
the Serbs to comply with the Vance Plan ( and the failure of the UN to
enforce it ( serves as an example of how the Serbs are likely to treat
any agreement that calls for them to withdraw from territory seized by
force in Bosnia. THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN (1992-93) UN mediators Cyrus Vance
and Lord David Owen, the EC mediator, developed a plan for peace in Bosnia
that would have divided the country into 10 ethnically-based provinces;
three each were to be controlled by Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim governments,
while Sarajevo was to be jointly administered. The plan was widely criticized,
including by the Clinton Administration in January 1993, for rewarding
the "ethnic cleansing" carried out by Serbian forces as part of their territorial
conquests. Nonetheless, it preserved the concept of a single federal entity
within Bosnia's pre-war borders. Bosnian Croat leaders and the Bosnian
government accepted the plan in the spring of 1993. The Bosnian Serbs rejected
the plan until faced with the Clinton Administration's threat to lift the
international arms embargo against Bosnia and use NATO air strikes to stop
Serbian offensives. Radovan Karadzic (the political leader of the Bosnian
Serb extremists) accepted the plan, until Secretary of State Christopher
failed to win the agreement of NATO allies to the "lift and strike" initiative.
Karadzic then called for a referendum on the plan, which Bosnian Serbs
loyal to him -- the only people "eligible" to vote -- rejected. Despite
the Plan's earlier endorsement by the UN Security Council, Lord Owen declared
it dead in early July, 1993. THE OWEN-STOLTENBERG PLAN (SUMMER-FALL 1993)
Shortly after Lord Owen declared Vance-Owen's demise, Serbian President
Milosevic presented a new plan for the ethnic partition of Bosnia. Owen,
along with Vance's successor, former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald
Stoltenberg, quickly accepted the Milosevic proposal as the new basis for
negotiations. The plan called for the division of Bosnia into three autonomous
regions, each with the right to eventually merge with a neighboring country
(applicable in practice only to Croatian and Serbian lands). Sarajevo would
be administered by the UN for two years, while agreement on its future
was negotiated. Under a similar arrangement, Mostar would be governed by
the European Community. In an effort to encourage acceptance by the Bosnian
Government, President Clinton promised to send tens of thousands of U.S.
peacekeepers as part of a NATO enforcement mission. The Bosnian government
eventually agreed to certain aspects of the plan. After U.S. and NATO threats
to use air strikes to stop the Serbs' strangulation of Sarajevo faded in
the late summer and early fall of 1993, however, the Serbs began to reverse
their original endorsement of the plan. The Serbs rejected the deal in
December, 1993, demanding more "quality" territory and access to the Adriatic
Sea. Negotiations stalemated after the Serbian rejection. THE CONTACT GROUP
PLAN (MAY 1994-PRESENT) In March 1994, the U.S. brokered a federation agreement
between the Bosnian Government and Croatian Serb forces, as well as a confederation
agreement between the new federation and the Croatian Government, thereby
ending the fighting between Croat and Bosnian forces in central Bosnia.
Negotiations with the Serbs, however, were frozen. In an attempt to revive
the diplomatic track in the aftermath of the Serbian offensive on the Gorazde
"safe area," the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and Russia formed the
Contact Group. The U.S. had previously refused to "draw maps" for fear
of being blamed for the unintended consequences of such an exercise (for
example, displacing inhabitants, creating economically unviable regions,
etc.), but now the U.S. reversed itself. The contact Group presented a
map to the Bosnian Federation and the Serbs that would divide Bosnia between
the two, with 51% of Bosnia's territory to the Federation and 49% remaining
under Serbian control. Constitutional and other political arrangements
were to be negotiated after agreement on the map, which was presented as
a "take it or leave it" final offer. The Bosnian Government was assured
that the agreement would preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity. The Contact
Group made clear that if either of the parties rejected the plan, it would
face harsh reprisals. The Serbs, in particular, were threatened with a
tightening of international sanctions, the use of air strikes, and, eventually,
the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia. The Bosnian Government
agreed to the Contact Group plan in July, 1994. The Serbs rejected it and
continue to do so. Instead of taking the threatened punitive measures against
the Serbs, however, the Contact Group has now offered further concessions.
Acting on Serbian President Milosevic's promise to blockade the Bosnian
Serbs, the Contact Group secured a provisional easing of certain UN sanctions
against Serbia. Numerous press and diplomatic reports have indicated that
the blockade, even if it were once serious, is now a charade. The U.S.
has retreated from its earlier efforts to secure Allied support for NATO
air strikes, even though NATO has committed to protecting Bihac and other
"safe areas." In addition, the U.S. and its partners have recently indicated
that the map can be re-negotiated to address Serbian concerns and that
a confederation of Serb-occupied territories in Bosnia with Serbia proper
is open for discussion. The latter concession would allow Milosevic to
accomplish his goal of creating a Greater Serbia by military conquest.
Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadzic, however, has since stated
that he may now insist on complete independence for Serb-held territory
in Bosnia. The Bosnian government has reiterated that its acceptance of
the contact Group plan was based on the "take-it-or-leave-it" commitment
of the Contact Group and that a Serbian confederation is non-negotiable.
INFO BRIEF AMERICAN COMMITTEE TO SAVE BOSNIA Updated: 27 December 1994
The AMERICAN COMMITTEE TO SAVE BOSNIA is affiliated with the ACTION COUNCIL
FOR PEACE IN THE BALKANS

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